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Abstract We review the literature on interoception as it
relates to depression and anxiety, with a focus on belief,
and alliesthesia. The connection between increased but
noisy afferent interoceptive input, self-referential and
belief-based states, and top-down modulation of poorly
predictive signals is integrated into a neuroanatomical and
processing model for depression and anxiety. The advan-
tage of this conceptualization is the ability to speciﬁcally
examine the interface between basic interoception, self-
referential belief-based states, and enhanced top-down
modulation to attenuate poor predictability. We conclude
that depression and anxiety are not simply interoceptive
disorders but are altered interoceptive states as a conse-
quence of noisily ampliﬁed self-referential interoceptive
predictive belief states.
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Depression and anxiety
Depression is a common mental health condition that
affects many aspects of daily life. Recent epidemiological
data estimate the lifetime prevalence of major depressive
disorder (MDD) at about 16% and the 12-month prevalence
at 6% (Kessler et al. 2003). MDD is about twice as com-
mon in females relative to males (Kessler et al. 1993),
manifests as an episodic but often recurrent illness with a
mean duration of 16 weeks, and is comorbid with many
other mental health conditions especially anxiety and
alcohol use disorders. The current classiﬁcation of
depressive disorders (American Psychiatric Association
1994) is based on operational criteria that have been
arrived at via consensus decisions by subject matter experts
(Kendler and Gardner Jr. 1998). However, there is little
evidence that these criteria delineate distinct biological
entities or subsume similar biological conditions in one
disorder (Sullivan et al. 1998). Nevertheless, there is sub-
stantial evidence from twin studies (Kendler et al. 1993),
linkage studies (Hill et al. 1988), and association studies
using single nucleotide polymorphisms (Liu et al. 2006)
for strong genetic contribution to the susceptibility for
depression. Other investigators have suggested that certain
temperamental such as harm avoidance (Ongur et al. 2005)
or personality traits such as neuroticism are associated with
increased propensity to develop depressive disorders
(Bienvenu et al. 2001). Neuropsychological investigations
have revealed that an increased bias for remembering
negative events (Watkins et al. 1996) and exaggerated
response to negative feedback (Elliott et al. 1997) may
constitute vulnerability factors for depression.
Anxiety disorders are the most common mental health
problem (Kessler et al. 1994). These disorders comprise a
heterogeneous group of conditions such as generalized
M. P. Paulus (&)  M. B. Stein
Department of Psychiatry, University of California,
San Diego (UCSD), 8939 Villa La Jolla Drive,
La Jolla, CA 92037, USA
e-mail: mpaulus@ucsd.edu
M. P. Paulus  M. B. Stein
Department of Family and Preventive Medicine,
University of California, San Diego (UCSD), La Jolla, CA, USA
M. P. Paulus  M. B. Stein
Psychiatry Service, Veterans Affairs San Diego Health Care
System, San Diego, USA
123
Brain Struct Funct (2010) 214:451–463
DOI 10.1007/s00429-010-0258-9anxiety disorder characterized by chronic worrying, panic
disorder with a sudden onset of autonomic symptoms
associated with a ﬂooding of thoughts and anxious expe-
riences, post-traumatic stress disorder characterized by
intrusive recollections of exposure to extreme and poten-
tially life-threatening events, obsessive compulsive disor-
der characterized by ruminative thinking and stereotyped
actions aimed at relieving anxious thoughts, social phobia
with fear of situations involving the potential for negative
evaluation, and speciﬁc phobias with object-related anxiety
symptoms. A common feature of all anxiety disorders is a
profound avoidance of the event, object, or context, which
has become associated with the experience or exacerbation
of the anxiety symptoms.
Twin studies support the idea that anxiety disorders
share a common genetic vulnerability that has been termed
anxious-misery and fear (Kendler et al. 2003). For exam-
ple, generalized anxiety disorder characterized by appre-
hensive expectation or chronic worry focused on multiple
life situations (Barlow et al. 1986) is a chronic condition
with a 12-month prevalence of approximately 3% that is
commonly comorbid with MDD and associated with sig-
niﬁcant functional impairment (Stein 2004). Moreover,
twin studies indicate that genetic and environmental risk
factors for the anxiety disorders are similar between men
and women and that the propensity for the development of
anxiety falls into panic-generalized-agoraphobic anxiety
versus speciﬁc phobias (Hettema et al. 2005). These stud-
ies, however, have also emphasized the individual envi-
ronment experience as a contributing factor to the
development of the disorder (Hettema et al. 2001). Neu-
ropsychological studies have proposed that an increased
emotional awareness (Novick-Kline et al. 2005), intoler-
ance of uncertainty (Dugas et al. 1998), and a cognitive
style termed looming vulnerability (Williams et al. 2005),
i.e., mental representations of dynamically intensifying
danger, appear to be among the cognitive predispositions to
generalized anxiety disorder.
Interoception: the basis for ‘‘how I feel’’
Interoception comprises sensing the physiological condi-
tion of the body (Craig 2002), as well as the representation
of the internal state (Craig 2009) within the context of
ongoing activities, and is closely associated with motivated
action to homeostatically regulate the internal state (Craig
2007). Interoception includes a range of sensations such as
pain (LaMotte et al. 1982), temperature (Craig and Bush-
nell 1994), itch (Schmelz et al. 1997), tickle (Lahuerta
et al. 1990), sensual touch (Vallbo et al. 1995; Olausson
et al. 2002), muscle tension (Light and Perl 2003), air
hunger (Banzett et al. 2000), stomach discomfort related to
low pH (Feinle 1998), and intestinal tension (Robinson
et al. 2005), which together provide an integrated sense of
the body’s physiological condition (Craig 2002). There are
two pathways from the periphery to the insular cortex.
First, these sensations travel via small diameter primary
afferent ﬁbers, which are thought to comprise a cohesive
system for homeostatic afferent activity that parallels the
efferent sympathetic nervous system (Craig 2007), and
terminate on projection neurons in the most superﬁcial
layer of the spinal dorsal horn. The modality-selective
lamina I spinothalamic neurons project to a speciﬁc thal-
amo-cortical relay nucleus, which in turn projects to a
discrete portion of dorsal posterior insular cortex. Second,
afferents traveling with the vagal and glossopharyngeal
nerve synapse at the nucleus of the solitary tract (van der
Kooy et al. 1984), which projects indirectly via ventro-
posterior thalamic nucleus and bi-directionally directly to
the posterior insula (Shipley 1982). Moreover, the insular
cortex projects directly to the speciﬁc ‘‘gastric’’ part of the
dorsal vagal complex (Bagaev and Aleksandrov 2006)a s
well as other brainstem autonomic nuclei (Ruggiero et al.
1987). Studies in the rat have shown that the insular cortex
is an important part of a highly interconnected central
autonomic system, which may be organized in a viscero-
topic manner (Saper 1982).
The posterior insula provides topographic and modality-
speciﬁc interoceptive signals to the anterior insular cortex
for integration (Craig 2003). These topographically orga-
nized and modality-speciﬁc pathways that carry intero-
ceptive signals are integrated in the anterior insula cortex
(Craig 2003), which is integrally connected with subcor-
tical (Chikama et al. 1997), limbic (Reynolds and Zahm
2005), and executive control brain systems (for review, see
Augustine 1985, 1996). An organism’s interoceptive state
and hedonic state are integrated via reciprocal connections
of the anterior insular cortex to corticolimbic and striatal
reward circuit components such as (a) anterior cingulate
(Augustine 1996), which is important for error processing
(Critchley et al. 2005; Carter et al. 1998) and evaluation of
action selection (Rushworth and Behrens 2008; Goldstein
et al. 2007), to (b) amygdala (Augustine 1985; Jasmin et al.
2004; Reynolds and Zahm 2005; Jasmin et al. 2003), which
is critical for processing stimulus salience (Paton et al.
2006), (c) nucleus accumbens (Reynolds and Zahm 2005),
which processes the incentive motivational aspects of
rewarding stimuli (Robinson and Berridge 2008), and (d)
orbitofrontal cortex (Ongur and Price 2000b), which has
been implicated in context-dependent evaluation of envi-
ronmental stimuli (O’Doherty et al. 2001; Rolls 2004a, b;
Bechara et al. 2000; Schoenbaum et al. 2003, 2006;
Kringelbach 2005; Rolls and Grabenhorst 2008).
Thus, the anterior insula has access to a multi-dimen-
sional representation and integration of the current and
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and is important for the capacity to be aware (Craig 2002;
Critchley et al. 2004) of oneself, others, and the environ-
ment (Craig 2009). The columnar organization of the
insular cortex shows a highly organized anterior-inferior to
posterior-superior gradient (for example, see Mesulam and
Mufson 1982), similar to other parts of the brain where
cortical representations are based on modulatory or selec-
tive feedback circuits (Shipp 2005). Therefore, it is not
surprising that anterior insula is involved in a wide range of
processes, including pain (Tracey et al. 2000), interocep-
tive (Critchley et al. 2004), emotion-related (Phan et al.
2002), cognitive (Huettel et al. 2004), and social functions
(Eisenberger et al. 2003). In summary, the anterior insula is
important for subjective feeling states (Craig 2002;
Critchley et al. 2004), and takes part in modulatory control
of decision-making by interacting with other limbic, and
cortical areas (Garavan et al. 1999).
Self: depression and anxiety
An important aspect of both anxiety and depression is the
altered experience of the individual with respect to self,
others and the future. Altered self-related processing, e.g.,
reduced tendency to self-favoring (de Jong 2002) and/or
exaggerated negative self-image (Hirsch et al. 2003), has
been implicated in the development of anxiety in general
(Bruch et al. 1995) and social anxiety in particular (Clark
and McManus 2002). Moreover, the anticipation of future
harm to the self has been proposed as a key process in
anxiety (Reiss 1997). Similarly, low self-esteem has been
found using rigorous statistical methodology as a critical
pathway for the development of depression (Kendler et al.
2006). This negative evaluative bias for self-relevant
information persists even when overt symptoms of
depression are absent (Gemar et al. 2001). Beck (1967)
proposed that depression is a manifestation of an unreal-
istic negative view about the relationship between the self
and the world.
An important aspect of self is corporeal awareness,
which has been deﬁned as the perception, knowledge and
evaluation of one’s own body as well as of other bodies
(Berlucchi and Aglioti 2009). The meaning and implica-
tions of the concept of a ‘‘self’’ has been the focus of study
for many philosophers and psychologists (James 1961).
More recently, other disciplines such as psychiatry, neu-
rology and neuroscience have begun to examine the psy-
chological and biological basis for the existence of the
‘‘self’’ (Gusnard 2005). Reﬂecting upon oneself relates to
an individual’s self-concept and plays a crucial role in the
maintenance of emotional and physical equilibrium. Being
aware of our internal state modulates approach and
distancing behaviors which, in turn, help us maintain and
regain homeostasis (i.e., regulation of internal body state).
The neuroanatomy of self-relevant processing has
recently been linked to the anterior cingulate cortex
and surrounding midline cortical structures. Evaluative
judgment produced signiﬁcant activation in the anterior
frontomedian cortex (Zysset et al. 2002). Others have
reported that self-reassurance, i.e., positive evaluation of
one self, was associated with left temporal pole and insula
activation (Longe et al. 2009). Results revealed that
activity in medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) predicted both
subsequent memory performance and judgments of self-
relevance (Macrae et al. 2004). The mPFC activates during
self- and other-evaluation versus the baseline semantic
positivity-evaluation condition (Schmitz et al. 2004). Pro-
cessing of information relevant to self activated superior
medial parietal areas in comparison to other, whereas other
led to greater activation in inferior medial parietal and left
lateral frontal areas than self (Seger et al. 2004). Moreover,
the correct recognition of self-encoded personality traits
engaged dorso-medial prefrontal cortex and lateral pre-
frontal regions, premotor cortex, parietal and occipital
cortex, caudate and cerebellum (Fossati et al. 2004).
Finally, the mPFC (Amodio and Frith 2006) is often found
active during resting conditions when individuals presum-
ably engage in internally directed attention, processing
self-relevant thoughts (Kelley et al. 2002) and beliefs
(Wicker et al. 2003). This area is also involved in cognitive
control, i.e., coordinating thought and action in accordance
with internal goals (Miller and Cohen 2001), and is part of
the ‘‘default mode’’ network involved in self-regulation
and monitoring of the internal milieu (Gusnard et al. 2001).
Considering the impact that our own self-concept has on
the way we behave and interact with our surroundings, it is
not surprising to ﬁnd the mPFC involved not only in the
judgment of one’s emotional state (Ochsner et al. 2004)b u t
also in self-reﬂection (Johnson et al. 2002). According to
Damasio, the ‘‘core self’’ is the summation of extero- and
interoceptive stimuli that form the experience of the self as
one integrated entity (Damasio 1999, 2003). Interoception
or self-perception of bodily signals is an important com-
ponent for the preservation of homeostasis via adaptive
attention allocation, contextual evaluation, and action
planning. The insula, considered the interoceptive center of
the brain, is critical for evaluating the potential impact of
stimuli on the body (Paulus and Stein 2006). Along with
the mPFC, the insula plays a crucial role in the detection of
emotionally salient stimuli (Morris et al. 1998; Phillips
et al. 1998), as well as in the generation and regulation of
affective responses (Phillips et al. 2003). Anatomically, the
insular cortex shares afferent and efferent connections with
the mPFC cortex (Ongur and Price 2000a) as well as the
anterior cingulate gyrus (Reynolds and Zahm 2005).
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in anxiety and depression, one has to consider how intero-
ceptive afferents and processes within the insular cortex are
integrated with the neural representation of the self. In
particular, because the self is a manifestation of past and
present cognitive, affective and body state experiences,
there must be a critical link between interoceptive processes
and so-called dysfunctional schemas, i.e., organized ele-
ments of past reactions and experience that form a rela-
tively cohesive and persistent representation, which guides
perception and appraisals (Segal 1988). Belief-related pro-
cesses provide this important link between the self and
interoception.
Belief: a key dysfunctional process in depression
and anxiety
Belief can be deﬁned as a propositional mental construct
that afﬁrms or denies the truth of a state of affairs and is
closely linked to basic judgment processes (Harris et al.
2007). The maintenance of a large and stable set of beliefs
is essential for intelligent behavior, since this forms the
basis for any actions which one may take to achieve one’s
goals (Elliott et al. 1995). More importantly, beliefs are
frequently used to build mental models of the state of the
world and are therefore important constructs to guide
decision-making. The psychological approach to charac-
terizing beliefs is complex and has focused recently on
developing testable process theories, which can be disam-
biguated using modern neuroscience. To understand recent
neuroscience ﬁndings of belief-based decision-making, it is
important to brieﬂy review a few relevant constructs.
The theory-of-mind and mentalizing has been an
important construct for the conceptualization of beliefs.
Theory-of-mind refers to the everyday ability to attribute
independent mental states of self and others to predict and
explain behavior (Happe 2003). The mechanisms under-
lying theory-of-mind have been extensively investigated
via reasoning tasks that require participants to predict the
action of agents based on information about beliefs and
desires. Others have investigated the ability to explain the
action of others and found systematic reasoning errors
(Wertz and German 2007). Typically, we infer other peo-
ple’s beliefs from what they tell us. However, behavioral
experiments have the advantage that the experimenter does
not have to rely on the degree to which an individual is
reporting truthfully. Behavioral experiments show that
false beliefs engage greater cognitive resources resulting in
longer response times, which may be due to the fact that
subsequent judgments and decision-making need to take
into account false beliefs as a conﬂict with the individual’s
perception of reality (Apperly et al. 2008).
Several neural substrates have been found to underlie
belief-related processes. First, the temporo-parietal junc-
tion (TPJ) has been implicated not only in processing the
attribution of beliefs to other people but also in the redi-
rection of attention to task-relevant stimuli. Recent studies
support the notion that the overlap between theory-of-mind
and attentional reorienting suggests the need for new
accounts of right TPJ function that integrate across these
disparate task comparisons (Mitchell 2008). Others have
found that the right TPJ differentially activated as a
function of belief and outcome and was highest for cases
of possible negative outcome based on the belief that
action of a protagonist would cause harm to others, even
though the harm did not occur (Young et al. 2007). In
comparison to neuroimaging studies, a report of brain-
damaged individuals revealed that, in addition to frontal
cortex, left TPJ is necessary for reasoning about the beliefs
of others (Samson et al. 2004). A study examining the
contribution of mPFC and TPJ in false versus true belief
reasoning showed that the dorsal part of the anterior cin-
gulate cortex, the right lateral rostral prefrontal cortex and
the right TPJ associated with false belief. The authors
suggest that cognitive control areas are involved in action
monitoring and stimulus-independent cognitive processing
whereas the activation of the TPJ might be related to the
computation of mental representations that create per-
spective differences, such as a person’s false belief that
contrasts with reality and therefore might be centrally
involved in the decoupling mechanism (Sommer et al.
2007). Taken together, the TPJ appears to be crucial for the
representation of a mental state associated with belief
formation, possibly focused on disambiguating true from
false beliefs.
The mPFC as pointed out above is often found to be
active during ‘‘resting’’ conditions when individuals pre-
sumably engage in internally directed attention processing
self-relevant (Kelley et al. 2002) thoughts and beliefs
(Wicker et al. 2003). Some investigators have found that
whereas mPFC is recruited for processing belief valence,
TPJ and precuneus are recruited for processing beliefs in
moral judgment mediating both encoding beliefs and
integrating beliefs with outcome for moral judgment
(Young and Saxe 2008). These ﬁndings are consistent with
those of others showing greater activation of anteromedial
prefrontal cortex and rostral anterior cingulate while par-
ticipants implicitly made associations consistent with
gender and racial biases. In contrast, associations incon-
gruent with stereotypes recruited dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (Knutson et al. 2007).
Several studies have shown that direct appraisals of the
self as compared to others more strongly recruited mPFC
and right rostrolateral prefrontal cortex. Moreover, direct
appraisals as compared to reﬂected appraisals recruited
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posterior cingulate, whereas reﬂected as compared to direct
appraisals recruited regions associated with emotion and
memory, e.g., insula, orbitofrontal, and temporal cortex
(Ochsner et al. 2005). Using event-related potential studies
investigating the neural substrates of false belief reasoning
revealed a speciﬁc late negative component which could be
located in the middle cingulate cortex, which may be
related to conﬂict or error detection (Wang et al. 2008).
Another approach is to examine individuals suffering from
dysfunctional belief systems. For example, individuals with
delusions or ﬁxed false beliefs provide an important clin-
ical sample to examine the rigidity to which false beliefs
are held. In comparison, subjects with delusions show
signiﬁcantly less rostral-ventral anterior cingulate activa-
tion but increased posterior cingulate activation during the
determining of self-relevance, which may contribute to
persecutory belief formation and maintenance (Blackwood
et al. 2004). Taken together, the mPFC appears to be
important for processing the degree to which beliefs are
self-relevant, possibly with emphasis on the correct or
incorrect, or acceptable versus unacceptable valence of the
belief.
The strength to which one holds to a belief is an
important regulator of human behavior and emotion. A
recent neuroimaging study shows that states of belief,
disbelief, and uncertainty differentially activated distinct
regions of the prefrontal and parietal cortices, as well as the
basal ganglia. These investigators propose that the ﬁnal
acceptance of a statement as ‘‘true’’ or its rejection as
‘‘false’’ relies on more primitive, hedonic processing in the
mPFC and the anterior insula (Harris et al. 2007). Con-
trasting belief-based versus belief-neutral reasoning, some
researchers have reported left temporal lobe versus parietal
lobe activation, respectively, which is thought to be mod-
ulated by lateral prefrontal cortex in case of overcoming
belief bias and ventral medial prefrontal cortex when suc-
cumbing to belief bias (Goel and Dolan 2003). Examining
belief-based decision-making in a navigation task under
uncertain conditions showed distinct regions of prefrontal
cortex activation which was consistent with an underlying
Bayesian model of decision-making that permits efﬁcient
goal-oriented navigation (Yoshida and Ishii 2006). Thus,
dorsolateral and ventromedial prefrontal cortex may have
important regulatory functions in moderating belief inten-
sity and the degree to which beliefs inﬂuence decision-
making. In comparison, when the observers judged the
actions to reﬂect a false belief, there was activation in the
superior temporal sulcus, orbitofrontal, paracingulate cor-
tex and cerebellum (Grezes et al. 2004). Others have
related belief-based decision-making to altruistic behavior
and found that medial orbitofrontal-subgenual and lateral
orbitofrontal areas mediate decisions to donate or to oppose
societal causes whereas more anterior sectors of the pre-
frontal cortex are distinctively recruited when altruistic
choices prevail over selﬁsh material interests (Moll et al.
2006). Therefore, additional brain regions may modulate
belief-based processing by contributing resources to (1)
over-ride beliefs or (2) enforce beliefs, (3) engage in
reward-related processing associated with beliefs (i.e., how
good it feels to be right), or (4) determine how one’s own
belief-based decision affects others.
Thus, altered interoceptive processing and anxiety or
depression is closely linked to the view of the self, which—
in turn—critically depends on belief-based processes.
Before integrating these ﬁndings into a interoceptive mode
of these disorders, however, one needs to consider that
evaluative processes are not static and absolute but are
dynamic and relative to the current internal state of the
individual. In other words, body state-related information
that affects the self and is being evaluated relative to one’s
belief about oneself is subject to the momentary internal
state of the individual. Alliesthesia is an important con-
struct that links these processes together.
Alliesthesia: a process connecting the inside world
to the outside world in depression and anxiety
Alliesthesia is a physiological construct introduced in 1973
to connect the stimulations that come from the ‘‘milieu
exterieur’’ and affect the ‘‘milieu interieur’’ (Cabanac
1971). Alliesthesia critically links the subjective experi-
ence of external stimuli to the internal state of the indi-
vidual. Cabanac (1971) proposed that a given external
stimulus can be perceived as either pleasant or unpleasant,
depending upon interoceptive signals. In particular, nega-
tive alliesthesia refers to the notion that repeated admin-
istration of a stimulus will affect the internal milieu in such
a way that the valence of the stimulus is attenuated, e.g.,
the second or third stimulation by a painful stimulus is not
experienced as aversely. In contrast, positive alliesthesia is
observed if the repeated administration of a stimulus
changes the internal milieu in such a way as to increase its
valence. The constructs of negative and positive alliesthe-
sia add the relative body state of the individual to the
notion of habituation or sensitization. The relative body
state has a profound effect on the experienced intensity and
valence of the stimulus. Evidence for positive alliesthesia
in anxiety comes from studies with socially anxious indi-
viduals. For example, repeated exposure to a social stressor
resulted in a signiﬁcantly greater increase of the skin
conductance in a high anxious group relative to a com-
parison group (Eckman and Shean 1997). Moreover, indi-
viduals with higher trait anxiety showed less habituation
during a repeated affective go/no-go paradigm (Hare et al.
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1232008). And some have argued that differential habituation
may contribute to differences in self-reported anxiety
(Houtveen et al. 2001).
Based on the alliesthesia construct, investigators have
proposed a dynamic, homeostatic hypothesis of mood
regulation (Cabanac et al. 2002; Ramirez and Cabanac
2003). This hypothesis proposes that (1) we experience the
intensity of a positively valenced stimulus based on the
evaluation of the stimulus relative to our internal state
(Cabanac 1992), and (2) we engage regulatory mechanisms
to maximize the hedonic aspect of the internal state. The
alliesthesia construct can be applied to both rewarding and
aversive stimuli, but it also provides an explicit connection
between the internal state (i.e., interoception) and reward-
ing or aversive stimuli in the environment. As pointed out
above, the construct of positive and negative alliesthesia is
similar to the notion of sensitization and habituation.
However, the latter constructs do not necessarily take into
account the internal state of the individual and focus
instead on an increase or decrease of frequency or intensity
of an observable behavior. Thus, alliesthesia provides a
direct link between the outer world and the inner world.
Moreover, the reference to an internal state identiﬁes
additional circuitry, e.g., insular cortex and its connectivity
to frontal cortical and extended amygdala circuits, which
can be empirically tested for its role in processing appeti-
tive or aversive stimuli.
Evidence for altered insula-related processing
in depression and anxiety
Both depression and anxiety are multifactorial disorders
that involve different brain processes and neural substrates.
Here, we selectively review neuroimaging studies that
provide evidence for the contribution of the insular cortex
to the regulation and dysfunction of mood and anxiety. The
results from these studies will be used to conceptualize the
basic dysfunction in depression and anxiety as that of
alliesthesia of internal body signals due to altered belief-
based self-relevance. In other words, a change in the
internal state of the individual, which may be due to an
increased bias toward negative self-view (depression) or
increased attentional biases toward threat (anxiety), sets up
beliefs that are used to interpret afferent internal body
signals. Moreover, external cues or internal thought pro-
cesses generate an anticipation of aversive body states that
sets up a body prediction error, i.e., the difference between
the current and anticipated body state. This body prediction
error acts as a motivating signal for individuals to withdraw
(depression) or avoid (anxiety). There are several neuro-
imaging studies that provide evidence for an altered acti-
vation pattern of neural substrates that are important for
interoceptive processing. For example, whereas increased
self-criticism was associated with activity in lateral pre-
frontal cortex regions as well as anterior cingulate, self-
reassurance was associated with—among other areas—
increased insula activation. Moreover, lateral prefrontal
cortex activity was positively correlated with high levels of
self-criticism (Longe et al. 2009). Worrying, a set of self-
relevant stereotypic cognitions, relative to neutral state-
ments has been associated with increased brain activation
in prefrontal cortex, striatum, and insula (Hoehn-Saric et al.
2004). Self-relevant aversive affective processing such as
guilt was also found to involve left anterior insular cortex
(Shin et al. 2000). Finally, sad self-relevant autobio-
graphical memories were found to activate the ventral
insula (Liotti et al. 2000). These examples provide clear
evidence for the involvement of insular cortex during
aversively valenced self-relevant processing.
The periacquaductal grey, amygdala, anterior cingulate
cortex, and anterior insula are key neural substrates in pain
processing (Ochsner et al. 2008; Wiech and Tracey 2009;
Chua et al. 1999). However, aside from the direct experi-
encing of an aversive stimulus, the anticipation of aversive
events and the interpretation of these events with respect to
the construct of one self are important processes to consider
in depression and anxiety. A number of studies have shown
that the anticipation of aversive events involves the insular
cortex. Several studies found that brain areas activated by
anticipation of aversive pictures include dorsal amygdala,
anterior insula, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, right dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex, and right posterior orbitofrontal
cortex (Nitschke et al. 2006; Simmons et al. 2004). This
network of activation in relation to the anticipation of
aversive stimuli extends to other modalities such as mone-
tary losses (Samanez-Larkin et al. 2008), conditioned
stimulus predicting an aversive stimulus (Marschner et al.
2008), and the expectation of pain (Ploghaus et al. 1999).
Moreover, insula activation is an important processing area
for the affective elements to an individual’s pain experience
in subjects with depression (Giesecke et al. 2005). Some
have argued that the insula and anterior cingulate are rela-
tively more sensitive to the expectation of unpleasant
stimuli relative to expecting pleasant or neutral stimuli
(Herwig et al. 2007). Finally, uncertainty or ambiguity is an
important aspect of anticipatory processing. Thus, it is not
surprising that the degree to which an individual is sensitive
to uncertainty correlates positively with activation in
bilateral insula during affective ambiguity (Simmons et al.
2008). Others have reported that unpredictable stimulus
presentations were correlated to brain activity in the ante-
rior insula (Carlsson et al. 2006). Taken together, these data
suggest that the insula plays an important role in processing
the anticipation and subjective experience of aversive
stimuli across a number of different modalities.
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ences is to examine the neural substrate activation dif-
ferences in individuals that differ on their level of
depression or anxiety. There is converging evidence from
these kinds of studies that the insula plays a central role
in anxiety and depression (Phan et al. 2002). Speciﬁcally,
responding to sad mood distractors was found to be
related to activation in anterior cingulate, ventromedial
and orbital prefrontal cortex and insula (Wang et al.
2006). Increased sadness induced greater blood ﬂow in
subgenual cingulate and anterior insula (Mayberg et al.
1999). Transient sadness was associated with signiﬁcant
loci of activation in the anterior temporal pole and the
midbrain, bilaterally, as well as in the left amygdala, left
insula, and right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, which
some have related to the degree of sadness (Levesque
et al. 2003), the degree of insomnia (Perico et al. 2005),
or to the degree of stress-related ACTH regulation
(Ottowitz et al. 2004). Dysthymic individuals relative to
comparison subjects show greater brain activation during
negatively valenced images in amygdala, anterior cingu-
late and insula (Ravindran et al. 2009). Patients with
MDD show an enhanced responsivity in insula, anterior
cingulate, and amygdala to non-painful stimuli and an
increased activation in the right amygdala during antici-
pation of pain which is associated with more self-per-
ceived helplessness (Strigo et al. 2008). The insula was
also more sensitive in MDD patients compared to controls
when presented with emotional images (Mitterschiffthaler
et al. 2003). Studies examining the role of the insula in
anxiety ﬁnd a similarly increased sensitivity. For example,
symptom provocation in anxiety activates, among other
structures, bilateral insular cortex (Rauch et al. 1997).
Anxiety-prone relative to comparison subjects show
greater bilateral amygdala and insula activation to emo-
tional faces (Stein et al. 2007). These individuals also
exhibit greater bilateral insula activation during the
anticipation of emotionally valenced pictures (Simmons
et al. 2006). The enhanced insular response is also found
in patients with speciﬁc phobia (Wright et al. 2003).
Moreover, panic disorder patients show relatively less
inhibitory (GABAergic) receptors in the insula, which is
correlated with severity of illness (Cameron et al. 2007).
Finally, several studies have highlighted the role of
increased insula activation during aversive, anxiety-rela-
ted processes such as combat-relevant stimuli (Vermetten
et al. 2007) or heat temperature (Geuze et al. 2007), in
patients with post-traumatic stress disorder. Taken toge-
ther, these studies show clear evidence for altered insular
cortex activation during a variety of different processes
that share in common three features. First, they involve a
stimulus that is evaluated with respect to one’s self;
second, the stimulus is typically viewed as aversive; and
third, these processes occur even if the actual stimulus is
not yet being perceived but is being anticipated.
Depression and anxiety: alliesthesia of internal body
signals and belief-based self-relevance
The basic model that is proposed here (Fig. 1)i sa n
extension and reﬁnement of the insular model of anxiety
that we proposed earlier (Paulus and Stein 2006). We
considered that anxiety is a result of an increased antici-
patory response to the potential of aversive consequences,
which manifests itself in enhanced anterior insular cortex
processing. The main aim of this model was to incorporate
interoceptive processing aspects into the conceptualization
of anxiety. In the current formulation, we extend this model
in three ways. First, we propose that beliefs, i.e., proposi-
tional statements that refer to the state of the individual,
which are processed in the mPFC and TPJ, contribute
Fig. 1 Proposed alterations in brain circuitry (top) and the resulting
process abnormalities in anxiety and depression. Brieﬂy, ‘‘noisy’’
afferent interoceptive information results combined belief-based
associations lead to an attempt of the cognitive control apparatus to
differentiate predictive from non-predictive signals. The resulting
experience (bottom) consists of ampliﬁed interoceptive afferents that
are associated with carry poor differentiation of stimuli that carry
predictive outcomes and create constant uncertainty for the future.
More details are described in the text
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123signiﬁcantly to the evaluation of the anticipatory inter-
oceptive signals. Second, we assume that positive allies-
thesia, i.e., an exaggeration of the valence (positive or
negative) relative to the individual’s internal state, plays a
role in enhancing the aversive aspects of predictive body
signals, i.e., initially sub-threshold afferent interoceptive
signals are ampliﬁed and associated with the prediction of
potential aversive or negative outcomes. Third, we propose
that individuals at risk for anxiety and depression exhibit a
reduced signal to noise ratio of interoceptive afferents.
Speciﬁcally, when these individuals receive body signals,
they cannot easily differentiate between those, which are
associated with potential aversive (or pleasant) conse-
quences versus those, which are part of constantly ongoing
and ﬂuctuating interceptive afferents. As a consequence of
positive alliesthesia, these individuals imbue afferent
interoceptive stimuli with motivational signiﬁcance, i.e., an
increased tendency to plan and act upon the reception of
this input. Speciﬁcally, an internal body signal, e.g., a heart
beat or inspiratory breathing sensation, is associated with
negative valence and linked to belief-based processes, e.g.,
‘‘there is something wrong with my heart’’ or ‘‘I am not
getting enough air’’, which results in an increased ‘‘ﬁght/
ﬂight’’ response and potential withdrawal or avoidance
behaviors. As a consequence of this noisy ampliﬁcation,
top-down modulatory brain areas such as the anterior cin-
gulate, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and orbitofrontal
cortex are engaged constantly to differentially amplify or
attenuate signals that are predictive or not predictive of
future states, respectively. This relative ‘‘overactivity’’ of
cognitive control-related brain areas is subjectively expe-
rienced as increased production of thoughts and associated
beliefs, which provide prediction enhancing propositions.
Practically, these cognitive processes result in ‘‘worrying’’,
which is aimed at providing increased prediction accuracy.
The proposed model integrates a network of processes
and neural processing substrates; however, it is less
deﬁnitive about the causal chain of events. As proposed
recently (Ochsner et al. 2009), distinct but overlapping
neural substrates are involved in both top-down and bot-
tom-up affective processes. Feeling states can be altered by
both exaggerated valence of interoceptive afferents as well
as exaggerated belief systems and it is not clear based on
the current literature, which alteration is primary. It may
even be possible to separate individuals into those who
experience a predominant bottom-up dysregulation versus
those who are subject to a primary top-down dysfunction.
However, this will require the construction of careful
experimental approaches that integrate interoceptive stim-
ulation, belief states, and modulation of anticipatory states.
The application of interoceptive modulation provides a
unique experimental approach that takes advantage of the
ﬁrm neuroanatomical basis of these processes to better
probe self-related evaluative processes that are so critical
for depression and anxiety.
There are two components of interoceptive dysregula-
tion in anxiety and depression. First, we implicate speciﬁc
neural substrates in the pathological processes observed in
anxiety and depression. Speciﬁcally, consistent with our
prior view of the role of insula in anxiety (Paulus and Stein
2006), this neural structure provides the contextualized
body prediction error signal to other brain structures. The
mPFC evaluates this body prediction signal based on self-
relevant and belief-based processes. The dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex and anterior cingulate respond to these
contextualized self-relevant and belief-based signals to
differentiate those that are predictive from those that are
not. The relative increase in anterior cingulate activity has
been reported in a number of studies with anxiety disorder
individuals (McClure et al. 2007; Nitschke et al. 2009;
Paulus et al. 2004). Therefore, altered brain processing in
both depression and anxiety is thought to comprise the
concerted and increased synchronicity of these brain
structures with the ultimate goal of adapting the individual
internal milieu to the demands of the outside world.
Second, the processes that are implicated in this model
extend beyond interoception to include belief-based and
self-referential aspects. In this context, one could consider
the combination of contextualized interoceptive afferents,
belief-based and self-referential constructs as ‘‘interocep-
tive prediction schemas’’ of the individuals. For example, a
rapid heart rate may ﬁt into a ‘‘positive excitement
schema’’ or into an ‘‘anxious potentially harmful schema’’,
i.e., the same afferent interoception can result in funda-
mentally different interpretation and therefore have com-
pletely different self-relevance. One important direction is
to determine the degree to which these interoceptive pre-
diction schemas evolve. In particular, one needs to consider
the interplay between the disposition to experience a poorer
signal to noise ratio of interoceptive afferents and speciﬁc
experiences, which may result in greater uncertainty due to
the catastrophic consequences of not predicting a signiﬁ-
cant aversive event. For example, an individual who is
particularly sensitive to interoceptive afferents and is
exposed to childhood mistreatment may need to engage all
available top-down modulatory processes to differentiate
interoceptive ﬂuctuation from predicting an impending
episode of mistreatment.
The proposed extension of the initial model is consistent
with other conceptualizations of depression and anxiety.
For example, altered self-schemas particularly as they
relate to personal worth (Teasdale et al. 1995) have been
proposed as a basic vulnerability for depression (Williams
et al. 1990). Moreover, a mismatch between self-relevant
schemas such as negative affectivity and physiological
arousal has been observed in individuals with generalized
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123anxiety disorder (Dibartolo et al. 1997). Practically, indi-
viduals with anxiety disorders show a marked tendency to
underestimate their level of physical exertion (Vaitl 1996).
Subjects with high emotional reactivity showed a higher
degree of interoceptive awareness based on the heart beat
detection task and higher trait anxiety, which has been
taken to suggest that a chronically increased sympathetic
outﬂow might be one variable contributing to the estab-
lishment of high interoceptive awareness (Pollatos et al.
2007a). Further analyses, however, revealed that the rela-
tionship between emotional arousal and trait anxiety was
mediated by differences in interoceptive awareness
(Pollatos et al. 2007b). Thus, there is some evidence that
anxious individuals show increased interoceptive sensitiv-
ity, which may be associated with reduced interoceptive
accuracy. Finally, enhanced fear-relevant schemas in the
context of external stimuli have been proposed to con-
tribute to the formation of excessive anxiety (Teachman
et al. 2001).
The value of the current model is to dissect both pro-
cesses and brain structures to be able to formulate and test
novel hypotheses about the fundamental dysfunction in
depression and anxiety. Speciﬁcally, we predict that indi-
viduals with anxiety and depression show (1) reduced
ability to adequately report interoceptive afferents; (2)
exaggerated response to aversive interoceptive afferents,
even those that are not predictive of aversive outcomes. As
a consequence, these individuals should perform more
poorly on tasks that are guided by somatic signals, e.g., the
Iowa gambling task. In summary, we propose that both
depression and anxiety represent altered interoceptive
states as a consequence of noisily ampliﬁed self-referential
interoceptive predictive belief states. Due to the uncertain
and noisy ascending interoceptive input, unstable intero-
ceptive schemas are developed that foster predictive
uncertainty and as a consequence an increased attempt to
top-down control and predict these inputs.
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